Two items about different aspects of the debt ceiling negotiations that I thought were interesting:
1. Ken Anderson’s post at Volokh. (MQ: “I call Washington all f**ked up and mean, because no rational person would seriously entertain default. You call Washington all f**ked up and mean, because no rational person would agree to these kinds of deficits. We think — in the current twitter-talk of a pox on both their DC houses — Washington is a mess because we can’t find a compromise. The truth is, however, we don’t actually think there is much room to compromise and, given that our principles on this represent a fairly sizable difference in world view, that’s probably right. The structural problem of Washington is that everyone has a hold-up; “let’s vote and majority policy wins” doesn’t work because we’ve allowed a consensus system informally to take hold, rather than a majoritarian one (albeit one revisable at least in part by a future majority).”)
2. Michael Dorf’s article, reposted at Justia, explaining the (now apparently defunct) McConnell Plan.
If anybody’s come across any good articles detailing (i) in what sense, and on what obligations, the United States would default if the ceiling were not raised, and (ii) what factors would go into the credit agencies’ decisions to downgrade the debt, he should pass it along.