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Here is an irritating question from an old LSAT I was recently reviewing:

Theories in certain scientific fields may be in flux today, but this unsettled state must be attributed to scientific progress, not to a lack of theoretical rigor. Several decades of scientific research have recently culminated in a wealth of new discoveries in these fields, and whenever many new facts come to light in a field, the ways in which that field organizes its knowledge inevitably need adjustment.

The argument proceeds by
(A) presenting the situation to be explained as part of a general pattern.
(B) referring to the unacceptable consequences of adopting a particular explanation
(C) showing that two alternate explanations for a situation are equally probable.
(D) citing a law of nature to explain a particular kind of change
(E) explaining why a situation came about by referring to the intended outcome of a course of action.

What the lSACs say is the answer, and why what the say is both an outrage against truth and vexatious, below the jump.

lSACs answer: A

But surely the correct answer is D. Notwithstanding the guy who wrote the question’s opinion, A is wrong because no “general pattern” plays an explanatory role. We have been told that “whenever many new facts come to light in a field, the ways in which that field organizes its knowledge inevitably need adjustment,” but this is perfectly compatible with a general pattern’s having never emerged, because this triad of propositions could all be true: (i) whenever many new facts come to light in a field, the ways in which that field organizes its knowledge inevitably need adjustment (ii) many new facts have never come to light in any field and (iii) (a general pattern of) scientific fields reorganizing after many new facts come to light in them has never emerged.

D is right because the passage explains changes in scientific fields by adverting to a causal claim that purports to hold true universally and without exception (“whenever many new facts come to light in a field [universally], the ways in which that field organizes its knowledge inevitably need adjustment [without exception]“). And, I’d think, it is sufficient for p’s being a law of nature that p is a causal claim purporting to hold true universally and without exception (at least within a certain subset of possible worlds).

Needless to say, this is vexatious because the lSACs get the last laugh.

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